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Abstract
This paper develops a utility model for evaluating lotteries. In
estimating utility, risk averse people use an asymmetric loss function.
Expected utility is seen as a special case that is a good approximation
of the general case in some cases. The model resolves several paradoxes
and makes easily falsiﬁable predictions. When used in hypothesis
testing, the model allows researchers to directly specify their attitudes
toward risk.
The model is advantageous for two reasons. First, it is based on
established principles of probability; second, it resolves several well-
known paradoxes.
Keywords: choice under uncertainty, non-expected utility the-
ory, risk aversion, Allais paradox, Ellsberg paradox, St. Peters-
burg paradox, Equity Premium Puzzle, decision theory.
11 Introduction
Suppose a lottery L has M outcomes numbered m =1 ,2,...M,
and outcome bm occurs with probability pm,
P
pm =1 .T h e
elementary utility of an outcome b is u(b). The most common
way of calculating the utility of the lottery is using the expected






There are several problems with expected utility. Aside from
the theoretical problems, there are more practical ones as well.
For example, expected utility fails to explain several well known
paradoxes, such as the Allais paradox, Ellsberg paradox, St.
Petersburg paradox, and the Equity Premium Puzzle.
In this paper, I take a diﬀerent approach. The utility of a
lottery, after the lottery’s outcome is known, is the elementary
utility of the outcome. That is, if we know that the lottery’s out-
come is bm,t h e nU(L)=u(bm). Before the outcome is known,
the utility of a lottery is a random variable. What people mean
when they refer to the utility of a lottery is actually a point
2estimate of the random variable. This approach has two advan-
tages. First, it is based on established principles of probability;
second, it resolves several well-known paradoxes.
Expected value is the optimal estimator under quadratic loss,
which is a symmetric loss function. In my view, a symmetric loss
function reﬂects risk neutrality. A risk averse individual uses
an asymmetric loss function in which higher loss comes from
overestimating utility. This causes his estimates of utility to be,
in general, less than expected utility.
In section 2, I describe the model. In section 3, I look at
several well-known paradoxes. Finally, in section 4, I discuss
the model in the context of hypothesis testing.
2U t i l i t y
Suppose a person plans to play some lottery a total of n times,






Deﬁne the utility of the lottery as the average per-game utility








In the above equations, since counts xm are random vari-
ables, so is ˜ U(L). When evaluating lotteries, people estimate
the utilities of those lotteries. I denote the random variable by
˜ U (L) and its estimate by by U(L). Risk neutral individuals care
about overestimating and underestimating utility equally: they
have a symmetric loss function. For instance, people who mini-
mize expected quadratic loss, estimate the utility of a lottery by
the expected value over elementary utilities. Risk averse indi-
viduals would rather underestimate utility than overestimate it:
they have an asymmetric loss function in which overestimation
is penalized more than underestimation.
If the probabilities pm are known, then counts {xm} have the
Multinomial distribution as follows:
{xm}|n,{pm} ∼ Mult(n,{pm}).( 4 )
In the case when there are M =2possible outcomes, this
reduces to the Binomial distribution.
4Sometimes, the probabilities pm themselves are unknown.
This is not a problem if their distribution is known. Suppose
the probabilities {pm} are ap r i o r iDirichlet distributed with
parameter vector {αm}. (In case M =2 , this is the same as
the Beta distribution.) We observe k outcomes. In these ob-
servations, outcome bm occurs ym times. Then, the posterior
distribution of the probabilities is Dirichlet:
{pm}|{ym} ∼ D({αm + ym}).( 5 )
From this, when probabilities pm are not known, counts xm
have the Multinomial-Dirichlet distribution.
Note that, if the probabilities pm are known, as the number





approach the probabilities p.T h u s ,
lim
n→∞
˜ U (L)=UE (L).( 6 )
So, any reasonable estimator of ˜ U(L) must also approach
expected utility UE(L). In other words, expected utility the-
ory can be thought of in two ways. First, it accurately reﬂects
preferences of risk neutral individuals with symmetric quadratic
5loss. Second, it is a limiting case when the number of games n
approaches inﬁnity and there is no uncertainty.
2.1 Loss function
A loss function C(˜ U,U) expresses the loss that an individual ex-
periences from estimating random utility ˜ U by some estimate U.
To ﬁnd the optimal estimate, the individual minimizes expected
























Each individual may have his own unique loss function C (·,·).
When discussing attitudes toward risk, we are interested in how
loss function penalizes overestimation as opposed to underes-
timation of utility. Let ∆ > 0 be some constant. If a per-
son is indiﬀerent between overestimating and underestimating
utility, that is, if C(U,U + ∆)=C(U,U − ∆),Ic a l lh i m
risk neutral. If a person is more afraid to overestimate util-
ity, that is, if C(U,U + ∆) >C (U,U − ∆),t h e nh ei srisk
6averse. Finally, if he is more afraid of underestimating utility,
C(U,U + ∆) <C (U,U − ∆),t h e nh ei srisk loving.
To perform calculations, we need to deﬁne a speciﬁc loss func-










˜ U − U
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where a ≥ 0 and ca ≥ 0 are constants. ca > 1 reﬂects risk
aversion, while ca =1reﬂects risk neutrality. When a → 0 and
c0 =1 , the loss function is called the all-or-none loss;w h e n
a =1 , it is the asymmetric linear loss;w h e na =2 ,t h i si st h e
asymmetric quadratic loss;w h e na =2and c2 =1 ,i ti st h e
usual quadratic loss.
Because a deﬁnes the general shape of the loss function, I call
it the type of loss; because ca deﬁnes the degree of asymmetry,
Ic a l li trisk aversion.
For linear (type 1) loss, there is an analytical solution for
the best estimator U.D e ﬁne q =( 1+c1)
−1; the best estimator
under type 1 loss is the q-th quantile of ˜ U. Thus, for symmetric
linear loss, the best estimator is the median of ˜ U. If the loss is
symmetric quadratic (a =2 , c2 =1 ), then the best estimator
7is the expected value of ˜ U. For arbitrary values of a and ca,
however, I don’t know of a general analytical solution, but ﬁnd
best estimates numerically.
The type of loss and risk aversion that people commonly have
need to be determined experimentally. In this paper, I concen-
trate on three types of loss. I use the linear (type 1) loss because
there is an analytical solution for the best estimator under this
loss. A problem with this loss is that for discrete random vari-
ables, the estimator of utility U (L) is not a continuous function
of risk aversion c1. Quadratic (type 2) loss is also attractive,
because symmetric quadratic loss is used so often. But because
there is no analytical solution for it, I don’t use it for the more
complicated problems, such as the Equity Premium Puzzle of
section 3.4. Finally, sometimes, type 2 loss produces estimates
that are too high to be of interest, while type 1 produces esti-
mates that are two low to be of interest. This is the case with
the St. Petersburg paradox of section 3.3. In that case, I use
type 1.5 loss.
82.2 Risk aversion
Here, I suggest a couple of thought experiments which can help
each person ﬁnd his own value of risk aversion ca.T h i si sd o n e
by imagining lotteries the values of which the person knows for
himself. For example, suppose the utility of a lottery has the
Discrete Uniform distribution, as follows: it is −1 with proba-
bility 50% and 1 with probability 50%. In a person’s view, the
utility of this lottery is U. Then, for a>1, his risk aversion ca
is
ca =( 1− U)
a−1 (1 + U)1−a. (10)
Selected values of risk aversion ca are tabulated in table 1.
Based on this thought experiment, for type 1.5 loss, risk aversion
c1.5 between 1.5 and 2.0 seems reasonable; for type 2 (quadratic)
loss, risk aversion c2 of 2.3 to 4.0 seems reasonable.
Let’s perform a similar thought experiment with another lot-
tery. Suppose the utility of a lottery has the Standard Normal
distribution and that a person values this lottery at U.F o rt y p e
1 (linear) loss, the corresponding risk aversion is












Table 1: Risk aversion ca corresponding to selected values of Discrete Uniform





where Φ(·) is the cumulative density of the Standard Normal.
For other types of loss function, I do not know of an analytical
solution for risk aversion. I solve for risk aversion numerically
and tabulate the values in table 2. Based on this thought exper-
iment, the following values of risk aversion ca don’t seem very
high: for linear (type 1) loss, c1 =6 ;f o rt y p e1.5 loss, c1.5 =9 ;
for quadratic (type 2) loss, risk aversion c2 =1 3does not seem
very high.
The above thought experiments are done just to get the feel
for the correct magnitude of risk aversion. In this paper, I use
10Utility U Type of loss a
1.0 1.5 2.0
0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
−0.5 2.3 2.9 3.6
−0.8 3.8 5.5 7.7
−1.0 5.4 8.7 13.1
−1.2 7.8 13.8 22.4
−1.5 14.1 28.4 52.5
Table 2: Risk aversion ca corresponding to selected values of Standard Nor-
mal utility described in the text.
low values of risk aversion to illustrate that even a small de-
viation from the standard symmetric loss approach (which is
implied by expected utility) can resolve a number of apparent
problems. Thus, when applying quadratic loss to discrete util-
ities, I use c2 =3 .0 (see table 1); when applying linear loss to
the Normal distribution, I use c1 =3 .8 (see table 2); when the
intermediate, type 1.5,l o s si sn e e d e d ,a sf o rt h eS t .P e t e r s b u r g
paradox, I use c1.5 =1 .7 (table 1). Actually, the paradoxes dis-
cussed below are resolved under a wide range of values of a and
ca. Using higher risk aversions ca resolves them even more easily.
2.3 Buying and selling
When a person buys a lottery, he will receive one of its potential
outcomes; when he sells a lottery, he will have to pay out one of
11its potential outcomes.1 That is, from the seller’s point of view,
all the outcomes are negated. This means that, if a person is
not risk neutral, his estimated utility of a lottery as a buyer is
not equal to the (negative) estimated utility as a seller.
For example, consider a lottery with two equally likely out-
comes: b1 =0 , b2 =1 ; the lottery will be played once (n =1 ). A
person’s elementary utility is u(b)=b; he has quadratic (type
2) loss and a risk aversion of c2 =3 .0. If the person is consid-
ering buying the lottery, he evaluates it at 0.25; that is, he is
willing to pay 0.25 or less for playing the lottery once. If, on
the other hand, the person is considering selling the lottery, he
evaluates it at −0.75. This means that he requires a payment
of 0.75 or more if he will have to make the payments speciﬁed
by the lottery.
2.4 Backward induction
If, by picking one of several lotteries, a person commits to play-
ing it n times, everything is straightforward: the person calcu-
lates the utility U(L) of playing each lottery n times, and picks
the lottery with the greatest utility.
1The terms going long a lottery and going short a lottery might be more accurate.
12Suppose, however, that the person knows that he will play n
times, but he can decide which lottery to play before each game.
Then, he does not choose a single lottery, but rather chooses a
lottery path. This is easily done with backward induction.
The person knows that during the last game, game n, he will
pick the lottery with the greatest one-game utility. Thus, when
making the choice for game n − 1,h ea l r e a d yk n o w sh i sc h o i c e
for game n. Similarly, when choosing the lottery for game n−2,
he already knows his choices for the last two games. In this
way, the person can calculate the best path of lotteries for all n
games. I use this logic in the Equity Premium Puzzle of section
3.4.
3 Paradoxes
The “paradoxes” discussed below are situations in which the
standard expected utility theory predicts one outcome, while we
observe another outcome in experiments. This points to a failure
of the theory to make correct predictions in some circumstances.
I resolve the paradoxes by showing that if the model developed in
this paper is used, the predicted and observed outcomes match.
133.1 Allais paradox
Here is a usual statement of the Allais paradox. A person is
asked to choose between the following two lotteries:
Gamble A Receive $1M (one million dollars) with 100% prob-
ability.
Gamble B Receive $5M with 10% probability, $1M with 89%
probability, or nothing with 1% probability.
He is also asked to choose between the following two lotteries:
Gamble C Receive $1M with 11% probability, and nothing
with 89% probability.
Gamble D Receive $5M with 10% probability, and nothing
with 90% probability.
It is observed that most people choose A over B and choose
D over C. However, according to expected utility theory, if a
person prefers A over B,h em u s ta l s op r e f e rC over D.
Denote the possible outcomes as b = {0,1,5}. Preferring A
to B means that the diﬀerence in utilities of these lotteries must
be greater than zero. In expected utility terms, that diﬀerence
is
14UE(A) − UE(B)=0 .11u(1) − 0.10u(5) − 0.01u(0). (12)
Likewise, the diﬀerence between expected utilities of D and
C is
UE(D) − UE(C)=0 .10u(5) + 0.01u(0) − 0.11u(1). (13)
In other words, these expected utility diﬀerences have the
opposite sign
UE(A) − UE(B)=−(UE(D) − UE(C)). (14)
Thus, according to expected utility, if a person prefers A to
B,i ti simpossible that he prefers D to C.
Here is a resolution of the paradox. Since the potential pay-
oﬀs are so large compared to the resources of most players, sup-
pose that the lotteries are only oﬀered once: n =1 .T or e ﬂect
decreasing marginal utility of money, let the utility of each out-
come b = {0,1,5} be logarithmic: u(b)=l n ( v+b),w h e r ev>0 is




A − B 0.05 −0.09
C −6.61 −6.06
D −6.63 −6.15
D − C 0.02 0.09
Table 3: Allais utilities as estimated under asymmetric quadratic (type 2)
loss, and by expected value. The paradox disappears under asymmetric loss.
corresponds to the player having about a thousand dollars.
Under quadratic loss with c2 =3 .0, the paradox disappears.
R e f e rt ot a b l e3w h i c hs h o w st h a tA is in fact preferred to B at
t h es a m et i m ea sD is preferred to C.
According to the model developed here, I predict that if peo-
ple are explicitly told that they can play the lotteries a very
large number of times, then they will make choices consistent
with expected utility.
3.2 Ellsberg paradox
Here is a usual statement of the Ellsberg paradox. An urn con-
tains 300 balls: 100 are red; of the rest, some are blue and some
are green. A person draws a random ball from the urn and is
asked to choose between the following lotteries:
16Gamble A Receive $1 if the ball is red.
Gamble B Receive $1 if the ball is blue.
He also has to choose between the following two lotteries:
Gamble C Receive $1 if the ball is not red.
Gamble D Receive $1 if the ball is not blue.
People usually prefer A to B and C to D. However, if we use
expected utility theory, it appears that a person who prefers A
to B h a st oa l s op r e f e rD to C.L e t pR be the probability of
ar e db a l la n dpNR be the probability that the ball is not red.
Then, under expected utility theory, preferring A to B implies
that, in the person’s view, pR >p B. But preferring C to D
implies that, in his view, pNR >p NB.S i n c epNR =1−pR,b o t h
of these inequalities cannot be true. The key to resolving this
paradox is to realize that people are not estimating probabilities
at all, they are estimating lotteries.
Consider these lotteries with the model presented in this pa-
per. A person plans to play his chosen lottery n times; xR is the
number of times he draws a red ball. Letting the utility of no





The estimate of this utility is the same thing but with xR









Since drawing any ball is equally likely, the person knows
that the probability of a red ball is pR = 100
300 = 1
3. From this,
he knows the distribution of the number of red draws xR:i ti s









On the other hand, he does not know the probability of a
blue ball pB. The person might believe that the probability
pB is distributed according to some probability function. Since
probability pB can be anything between 0 and 2
3, the person
might think that pB is distributed Uniformly between 0 and 2
3.
If f (pB) is the probability density of pB, then the distribution





B (n,pB)f (pB)dpB. (19)
If f (pB) is in fact Uniform, the expected number of red draws
xR is equal to the expected number of blue draws xB: E [xR]=
E [xB]. However, the variance of blue draws is greater than the
variance of red draws: Va r(xB) >V a r (xR). This is because
the probability of red draws is certain, while the probability of
blue draws is not. The added uncertainty adds to the variance.
Under asymmetric loss, with equal expected values and unequal
variances, the estimate ˆ xB is less than ˆ xR. Because of this, the
person prefers A over B.
The same logic applies to the second pair of lotteries. Let
xNR be the number of non-red draws. Then, because of equal
expected values and unequal variances, the estimate of the num-
ber of non-blue draws is less than the estimate of the number
of non-red draws: ˆ xNB < ˆ xNR.A n d s o , U(A) >U (B) and
U (C) >U(D).
As a numerical example, let’s say that u(1) = 1, u(0) = 0,
and the number of games is n =2 0 . I use quadratic loss with




A − B 0.05
C 0.62
D 0.57
C − D 0.05
Table 4: Ellsberg utilities.
4. As the table shows, A is preferred to B while C is preferred
to D.
3.3 St. Petersburg paradox
Here is a discussion of the St. Petersburg paradox based on
(Martin 2001). A fair coin is ﬂipped until it comes up heads for
the ﬁrst time. Let k be the toss on which this happens. Then,
the St. Petersburg lottery pays $2k. The question is, how much
would someone be willing to pay for playing this lottery? The







22 + ...= ∞. (20)
From this, it might appear that people would be willing to pay
an inﬁnite amount of money for the lottery, which is obviously
wrong. One ﬂaw with the above presentation of the paradox is
20that it is made in terms of payoﬀs, not utilities. In fact, the ﬁrst
solution of the paradox, proposed by Bernoulli, is that people
perceive payoﬀs in terms of utilities which are increasing, but at















However, we can easily circumvent this solution by making
the payoﬀsn o t2k, but higher. If u−1(·) is the inverse of the
elementary utility function, let’s make the payoﬀ u−1¡
2k¢
.I n
this case, the expected utility of the lottery is inﬁnite, and so
it appears, once again, that people should be willing to pay an
inﬁnite amount for it.
Now, consider this lottery in the framework presented here.
For simplicity, let the utility of an outcome be equal to the
outcome: u(b)=b. Under quadratic (type 2) loss, the value of
utility diverges to inﬁnity, regardless of what the risk aversion c2
is. Under linear (type 1) loss with either risk neutrality or risk
aversion (c1 ≥ 1), the utility U(L) is always 2. While this is one
possible answer, it is rather uninteresting. It could be argued
that the answer is simply an artifact of the fact that the linear
21loss produces discontinuous estimates when applied to discrete
distributions.
Consider now a type of loss that is between the two types dis-
cussed above, namely, the type 1.5 loss. Under this loss function,
the utility of the lottery converges to a value greater than 2.F o r
example, if the number of games is n =1and the risk aversion
is c1.5 =1 .7, the utility of the lottery converges to U(L) ≈ 3.85.
3.4 Equity premium puzzle
This section provides some insight into the Equity Premium
Puzzle. The diﬀerence between the return on equities and the
return on almost riskless bonds is called the equity premium.
Because equities are risky while bonds are not, expected eq-
uity premium is positive. In the United States and some other
countries, when viewed through the lens of various asset pric-
ing models, the premium seems excessive. According to asset
pricing models, which use expected utility theory, risk aversion
required to sustain such a large premium is unrealistically high
(Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ 1996, p. 310). There are two possible ex-
planations for this paradox: either the asset pricing models do
not accurately describe human behavior, or people are, in fact,
22extremely risk averse, at least in some situations.
The classic paper on the subject is (Mehra & Prescott 1985).
The paper examines real returns on stocks and almost riskless
bonds between the years 1889 and 1978. The average real re-
turn on stocks was 6.98% per year, while on bonds, it was 0.8%
per year. Thus, the equity premium is 6.98% − 0.8% = 6.18%
per annum. But, according to asset pricing models, which use
expected utility theory, under reasonable values of risk aversion,
equity premium should not be greater than about 1% or 2%.
Similarly large equity premiums are present in other data as
well. (Shiller 2000) gives annual data on Stocks, Bonds, and the
Consumer Price Index between the years 1871 and 1997.2 Stocks
data consists of January values of the Standard and Poor’s Com-
posite index and yearly dividend data for those stocks. Bonds
data is the total nominal return from investing in January and
then reinvesting in July at the six month prime commercial pa-
per rate. Based on the (Shiller 2000) data, I calculate real re-
turns for holding Stocks and Bonds. Rate r is the real annual
return; Logarithm Return (LR) is ln(1 + r). The calculated sta-
tistics are in table 5. According to this data, the equity premium
2Thanks to John Nuttall of University of Western Ontario for providing the data.
23Return r Log return ln(1 + r)
Mean Std dev Mean µ Std dev σ
Stocks 0.0860 0.1750 0.0689 0.1669
Bonds 0.0296 0.0681 0.0270 0.0658
Correlation coeﬃcient
Stocks-Bonds 0.107 0.129
Table 5: Returns on Stocks and Bonds from 1871 to 1997.
is 8.60% − 2.96% = 5.63%, still much greater than 2%.
I use the model developed in this paper, with a relatively
low value of risk aversion, to predict investor behavior in two
cases: when the returns are as described by the data; and when
returns are such that the equity premium is 2%.I ﬁnd that
the predicted investor behavior if returns are as observed seems
reasonable, while behavior when equity premium is set to 2%
seems very unreasonable.
Suppose only two investment vehicles are available: Stocks
and Bonds: V = {S,B}. In the minds of investors, the Loga-
rithm Rates are Normally distributed with statistics as shown in
table 5, and zero correlations across time. Each investor knows
the number of years n that he will invest. For example, this
could be the number of years to retirement. To simplify com-
putations, I use the linear (type 1) loss function. Each investor
knows his risk aversion c1, which could be related to personal-
24ity, family situation, and so on. I assume the relatively low risk
aversion of c1 =3 .8 (see table 2 in section 2.2).
For convenience, let t be the number of years until the investor
stops investing (such as until retirement). Thus, the ﬁrst year
of investing is t = n while the last year is t =1 .D e ﬁne the
utility from investing is the logarithm of the total return. In
other words,






ln(1 + rt), (22)
where rt is the real return that the investor receives in year
t.
Before the beginning of each year, investors decide what per-
centage of their money to put into each of the investment vehi-
cles. They determine the optimal investment path by backward
induction, as discussed in section 2.4. The utility is Normally
distributed as follows:











where µt and σt are mean and standard deviation of the Log-
arithm Return of the investment mix chosen for year t.I fπV,t















The right hand side variables, µV, σV,a n dρSB, are taken
from table 5.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of money invested in Stocks,
as a function of time remaining t, for a person with risk aver-
sion c1 =3 .8; the rest of the money is held in Bonds. Until
there are t =2 1years left, the person holds all his money in
Stocks. Starting from t =2 0 , he gradually begins to shift from
Stocks into Bonds. In t =8 , proportion invested in Stocks falls
below 50%. During the last year of investing, when t =1 ,t h e
proportion is πS,1 = 22%.
Now, suppose that, following asset pricing models, equity
premium was 2%. That is, all the data is as is, except that
the returns of Stocks rS are shifted by −E [rS]+E [rB]+0 .02.
This changes the expected return on Stocks without changing
their risk (standard deviation of return) or correlation to Bonds.
26Figure 1: Optimal investment path under observed equity premium. Pro-
portion invested in stocks versus years to retirement.
27The estimated mean of Logarithm Return for Stocks becomes
µS = E [ln(1 + rS)] = 0.0339. Figure 2 shows the proportion of
money invested in Stocks, as a function of t, under this scenario.
Now, the person starts shifting into Bonds at t = 786; he starts
investing less than 50% in Stocks at t = 312;h es t a r t si n v e s t i n g
less than 20% in Stocks at t =2 7 . Such an investment path is
very unrealistic.
4H y p o t h e s i s t e s t i n g
In this section, I outline some ideas on how to apply the utility
model presented in this paper to hypothesis testing. Hypoth-
esis testing allows us to tell whether suﬃcient evidence exists
for some proposition of interest. For example, based on data
related to some quantity β, we might want to know if there is
suﬃcient evidence that β>0.T h ealternate hypothesis, HA,i s
the proposition for which we would like to know whether suﬃ-
cient support exists; the null hypothesis, H0, is the complement
of the alternate. In this example, H0 : β ≤ 0;HA : β>0.
In conventional hypothesis testing, the size of the test is usu-
ally set to 5%; sometimes, it is also set to either 10% or 1%.T h e
researcher sets the size of the test somewhat arbitrarily, without
28Figure 2: Optimal investment path if equity premium was 2%. Proportion
invested in stocks versus years to retirement.
29any direct reference to his attitude toward risk. Many times a
null can be rejected at one common level, such as 5%, but not at
another common level, such as 1%. In this situation in particu-
lar, the researcher has to have his preferences well-quantiﬁed.
4.1 The basic utility approach
Let B be a random variable, such as the response to some treat-
ment. u(B) > 0 means that the response is desirable. B can
take on M possible values, subscripted with m =1 ,2,...,M.
A researches has already observed some values of this random
variable. He wants to know that, if the treatment is applied in
the future, the average utility of the treatment will be positive.
The possible values of the random variable {bm} are known,
but their probabilities pm are not. In observations, outcome bm
occurs ym times. The researcher plans to apply this treatment
n times. The utility of the treatment, ˜ U (L), is the average per-
application utility. If the researcher’s estimate of this utility is
positive, he concludes that, on average, the treatment produces
desirable results; if the estimate is zero or negative, then the
researcher concludes that, on average, the treatment produces
undesirable results. The researcher explicitly accounts for his
30attitudes toward risk in the estimation process by choosing an
appropriate loss function.
For simplicity, assume that the treatment, if chosen, will be
applied a lot of times (n is very large). Then, the ratios x
n
reduce to the probabilities. But keep in mind that the proba-
bilities themselves are not known but rather follow the Dirichlet






Suppose u(B) can be any integer between −10 and 10,a l la
priori equally likely. A researcher observes the utilities of k =2 0
treatments. These observed utilities are:
−10,−7,−6,−2,−2,−1,−1,0,2,2,5,6,6,7,8,8,9,9,9,9. (27)
The researches wants to know whether, if he applies the treat-
ment a very large number of times, the average per-application
utility will be positive.
Let µ be the expected value of u(B). In the conventional hy-
pothesis test framework, the researcher would test the following
31hypothesis: H0 : µ ≤ 0;HA : µ>0.L e tˆ µ be the estimator of
expected value µ,a n dl e tˆ σ be its (estimated) standard devia-
tion. Ap r i o r i ,i fµ =0 ,t h er a t i o
ˆ µ
ˆ σ
has the t distribution with
20−1=1 9degrees of freedom. From this, if the size of the test
is 5%, the critical value of the test statistic is 1.73; if the size is
1%, the critical value is 2.54.
The observed ˆ µ is 2.55; the observed ˆ σ =1 .30.T h eo b t a i n e d
test statistic is 1.97. Thus, the researcher accepts the hypothesis
that µ>0 at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level. It’s not clear
what decision the researcher should make since there is no direct
correspondence between the size of the test and the researcher’s
attitudes toward risk.
Now, let’s apply the approach developed above. Since ap r i o r i
all outcomes are equally likely, set the prior parameter αm =1
for all m. Figure 3 shows the distribution of utility of treatment,
˜ U (L). The researcher calculates the point estimate of the utility,
U (L), by specifying the parameters a and ca of the loss function
that best reﬂect his preferences. In this example, the utility is
positive under a wide range of very reasonable parameters. For
instance, if the researcher has quadratic (type 2)l o s sw i t ha
moderate risk aversion of c2 =1 3 .1, then utility is U (L)=0 .3;
32Figure 3: Distribution of utility for the sample calculation.
for a higher risk aversion of c2 =2 2 .4, utility is still positive
at U (L)=0 .1. (See table 2 for risk aversion c2.) A very high
risk aversion of c2 =5 2 .5 does produce a negative utility of
U (L)=−0.2 though. Whether the researcher decides that the
treatment has a desirable eﬀect depends directly on his easily
quantiﬁable degree of risk aversion.
335C o n c l u s i o n
The utility model presented here is attractive theoretically since
it is built upon solid probability principles. The model sheds
light on several well-known paradoxes. The model can also be
put to good use in hypothesis testing.
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